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Writing the Battle: Jutland in Sir Julian Corbett’s Naval Operations. 
 
Sir Julian Corbett’s Naval Operations, the Official History of British Grand 
Strategy and naval operations, was dominated by the need to understand and 
promulgate national strategic doctrine.1 It should read as the culmination of 
his work stretching back the late 1890s, in which he had analysed the 
evolution of British strategy, and recovered the guiding principles for his 
audience, mid career and senior naval officers, statesmen and soldiers. It 
would be the basis for post-war service education, and the development of 
doctrine. These agendas forced him to reconcile the ghastly reality of total 
war on the European continent with pre-war expectations of a limited 
maritime conflict, exemplified by the Seven Year’s War, 1756-1763. In his 
1960s study of Britain’s naval war Arthur Marder ignored the strategic 
dimension of Corbett’s work, and his didactic agenda, underrated Corbett’s 
influence on the Navy, and national strategy, and discounted his ‘detailed, 
authoritative; restrained judgements’ as a semi-popular treatment aimed at 
the public. He assumed, or at the very least implied, that the ‘real’ official 
accounts were contained in the Staff Histories, ‘written by the Historical 
Section of the Naval Staff.’2 In reality the Staff Histories, detailed 
operational and tactical studies, served a very different purpose to Corbett’s 
grand strategic work, providing detailed analysis required for operational 
and tactical doctrine, work which Corbett never attempted, and was properly 
conducted by naval officers. Corbett’s book was primarily intended for the 
Senior Officers’ War Course, following the model he had established in 
1907, and expounding strategic doctrine for post-war service leaders. While 
he may have hoped to record the successful application of a classic British 
limited maritime strategy, conducted by both services in close concert, 
culminating in devastating economic warfare, he was left to explain how that 
strategy had been deflected and distorted by the influence of politics, 
alliances, and alien strategic concepts.   
  Corbett arranged the operational-tactical narrative around a politico-
strategic core that integrated operations into the higher direction of war, 
where civilian government, allied diplomacy and enemy policy interacted, 
with a critical focus on the civil-military interface. His sources were 
strikingly rich, reflecting close personal relationship with Maurice Hankey, 
                                                 
1 Corbett, J.S. ‘Napoleon and the British Navy after Trafalgar’ Creighton Memorial Lecture delivered 
11.10.1921. The Quarterly Review April 1922. 
2 Marder, A.J. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Volume 5 1918-1919: Victory and Aftermath.    
Oxford UP 1970 pp.306, 362. 
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all five wartime first Sea Lords, Battenberg, Fisher, Jellicoe, Jackson and 
Wemyss, and the Admiralty Secretariat. He discussed Jutland with Jellicoe, 
and other senior officers.3 He had access the papers of Dardanelles 
Commission, Ian Hamilton’s Diaries, and the personal correspondence of 
Henry Jackson, Rosslyn Wemyss and Roger Keyes, among others. He 
worked closely with Reginald Tyrwhitt, and possessed an inside track to the 
War Cabinet through Hankey a fellow maritime strategist, who provided 
insights from within the High Command in exchange for a succession of 
brilliant memoranda and other contributions.  
   After the war Corbett’s work was contested by Winston Churchill and later 
David Beatty, who tried to block or deflect his criticism of their failings. 
While explaining Corbett’s problems dealing with these powerful men his 
biographer, Professor Schurman, underestimated Corbett’s resolve, 
determination and above all his success.4 Neither Churchill nor Beatty could 
prevent his version of events reaching the public. When Admiral Sir 
Berkeley Milne publicly contested Corbett’s account of the escape of the 
Goeben in 1920 he was roundly condemned by the mainstream press, which 
upheld Naval Operations, and above all Corbett’s magisterial judgements.5 
The development of Corbett’s account of Jutland demonstrates that the 
positions adopted by Marder and Schurman require attention.  
  Corbett explained his concept of official history in April 1913, to an 
audience of international academic historians, and British naval officers. 
Reflecting on his experience using Official Histories from other countries, 
and writing a confidential official history of the Russo-Japanese war for the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), he stressed the importance of 
strategic analysis, not tactical detail, the grand sweep of the past, not the 
piling up of facts. He condemned the massive tactical compilations produced 
by the Historical Section of the Great German General Staff.6 As director of 
the Official History effort Corbett selected the other official historians, 
                                                 
3 Corbett Diary (henceforth Diary) 20.5.1920: Corbett MS National Maritime Museum Greenwich 
(henceforth NMM) CBT 43/19 
4 Schurman, D. Julian S. Corbett, 1854-1922: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe. 
London 1981 pp.163-95 rehearses the process from Corbett’s perspective, while those of Jellicoe and 
Captain John Harper were published by Temple-Patterson, A. ed. The Jellicoe Papers Vol.II London Navy 
Records Society 1968 pp.399-490.  
5 Cuttings and notes in the 1920 Diary from Punch, the Times and the Pall Mall Gazette: CBT 32./20. 
6 Corbett, J.S. ‘Staff Histories’ in Corbett, J. S. & Edwards, H.J. eds. Naval and Military Essays: Being 
Papers Read at the Naval and Military Section of the International Congress of Historical Studies 1913. 
Cambridge 1914. Corbett, J. S.  Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905. by. 
Hattendorf,  J. & Schurman, D.M. USNIP Annapolis 1994. 
 3 
helped find commercial publishers, edited and approved all the official 
histories.7  
  After an intellectual career in which he had traced the upward curve of 
British strategic success and power Corbett faced the problem of dealing 
with failure and uncertainty. In The Seven Year’s War: A Study in Combined 
Strategy of 1907 he had explained how the decisive fleet battle at Quiberon, 
which destroyed the enemy fleet, had been brought on by the success of a 
major combined arms operation at Quebec. This was what he meant when he 
wrote:  
it must not be forgotten that convenient opportunities of winning a 
battle do not always occur when they are wanted. The dramatic moment 
of naval strategy have to be worked for, and the first preoccupation of 
the fleet will almost always be to bring them about by interference with 
the enemy’s military and diplomatic arrangements.8  
By contrast Volume III of Naval Operations would have to deal with Jutland 
and Gallipoli, altogether less compelling examples than Quebec and 
Quiberon, examples which seemed to call into question that doctrine. The 
educational importance of his texts, they were always intended to be the 
‘Bible’ of the post-war War Course, the basis for Corbett’s post-war 
lectures, made it essential to rationalise the Dardanelles/Gallipoli, and 
Jutland, demonstrate the relative unimportance of fleet battle, and lay out a 
higher, expressly maritime conception of the way in which British wars were 
won.  
  Although Corbett did not live to complete the project, his voice effectively 
stilled on the morrow of Jutland, he left ample evidence of his intentions, 
notably in a major public lecture on the Napoleonic conflict.9 Ultimately he 
established the strategic model of how the war should have been waged, and 
then examined why it had ended up being fought along very different lines.  
  From the opening days of the war Corbett had been acutely conscious of 
the educational opportunity that could be drawn from the CID history 
project. Installed as the Admiralty representative, only civilian member, on 
the Historical Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 
August 24th Corbett began collecting evidence and compiling a narrative 
account of the opening months of the war.10 This work replaced his pre-war 
task, writing a confidential strategic analysis of the Russo-Japanese War, in 
                                                 
7 His diaries evidence his role managing the history project.  
8 Seven Years War I pp.3-4. 
9 Corbett, J.S. ‘Napoleon and the British Navy after Trafalgar’ Creighton Memorial Lecture delivered 
11.10.1921. The Quarterly Review April 1922.  
10 Daniel, Col. E.Y. ‘Official Histories’ 3.9.1919. Cabinet Memo: TNA CAB 103/83 p.3.  
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late 1914. He recruited additional staff, authors, sailors and administrative 
support, largely from personal contacts. His position was relatively secure, 
because he had the complete support of Vice Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, 
chairman of the sub-committee, and Maurice Hankey, the increasingly 
powerful Secretary of the War Council. Both were colleagues and in Slade’s 
case fiends, of long standing. Hankey pushed the official history project, and 
the necessary funding against stiff opposition from the Treasury, relying on 
Corbett’s memoranda to break through the penny pinching mentality of the 
Department. It helped that he shared Corbett’s strategic vision,  
   While Hankey was absent at the Dardanelles in August 1915 the Historical 
Sub-Committee proposed two 2 volume histories, dealing with Naval and 
Colonial, and Military Operations. Corbett would produce the former, Sir 
John Fortescue ‘(the historian approved by Lord Kitchener)’ the latter. 
However, nothing was settled. In December 1915 the Treasury refused to 
provide fund the project. Corbett drafted a powerful memorandum, which 
Hankey signed before presenting it to Prime Minister Asquith. The case for 
an official history was ‘very strong indeed’.   
Owing to the development of modern rapid communications, 
censorship and secrecy have been carried to a pitch unknown in 
previous wars. The result is that the general public and even the 
professional sailor and soldier know very little of the history of the war. 
To this day, for example, very little is known of the movements of the 
Allied Fleets, nor of the great concerted naval and military operations 
which brought about the extinction of the German commerce 
destroyers. Such vitally important matters as the escape of the Goeben 
are a closed book to all but a very few. The despatches of the British 
Generals only illuminate one narrow portion of the land operations and 
give little idea of the huge combinations of which they formed but a 
minor part. The objectives and intentions of the Dardanelles and 
Salonica operations are quite imperfectly understood.11 
The phrasing is Corbett’s and so are the ideas. Treasury parsimony met with 
withering scorn. For the cost of three 15 inch shells the nation would ensure 
‘the useful services of the Section as an educational centre’ as well as ‘the 
actual history.’   
Hundreds of millions are spent on the war and yet a few thousands are 
grudged to enable the State and the Services to benefit by its 
                                                 
11 Hankey Memo 23.12.1915: CAB 103/68 p.4 
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experiences …. for history is the ‘Memory’ of the services, and without 
it the lessons will be forgotten alike by statesmen, sailors and soldiers.12 
Corbett believed the role of Official History was to help develop future 
doctrine, the ‘Soul of Warfare’.13 Following prolonged negotiations between 
the relevant departments, Corbett was commissioned to write the official 
‘interim’ public history for the CID in March 1916. It would be published by 
a commercial house, Longman, his usual publisher.14 The decision was made 
public on 28 June 1916.15 
  Naval Operations would record the higher direction of a British war, 
emphasising ‘the deflection of strategy by politics’. It followed the model 
Corbett had established in England in the Seven Year’s War: A Study in 
Combined Strategy of 1907, based on courses taught at the Royal Naval War 
Course, and the Army Staff College, Camberley. Having analysed the 
evolution of British strategic doctrine across two hundred years, and situated 
that experience in a theoretical model largely developed from Clausewitz, 
Corbett produced a conceptual/doctrinal strategic framework in the officially 
sanctioned primer Some Principles of Maritime Strategy of 1911.16 These 
texts were the model and framework of the new book. Corbett approached 
the new project with two overriding aims: to restore the unique and specific 
British strategy based on sea control, economic warfare and combined 
operations; and contribute to the intellectual development of the War Course 
– tasks that would require him to revise and update Some Principles. His 
anxiety to ensure the experience of mobilising mass conscript armies for 
continental warfare should be recognised as unBritish and aberrational, was 
widely shared among the naval and political leadership. This ensured his 
would be the first Official History to appear. It would be the ‘bible’ of the 
post-war Naval War Course. When he resumed lecturing at Greenwich in 
1920 he used early drafts from the Naval Operations.17 Ultimately the new 
book would refresh and reinforce lessons derived from the age of sail.  
    In addition Corbett’s text had an important public information role, one 
that provided full scope for his core concept, ‘showing influence of fleet on 
war and prevent Army from getting out of focus… to keep the Navy 
                                                 
12 Diary 20-22.12.1915: CBT 43/14. Hankey Memo 23.12.1915: CAB 103/68 p.8 & 9. 
13 Corbett, J.S. ‘Staff Histories’ in Corbett, J.S. & Edwards, H.J. eds. Naval and Military Essays. CUP 1914 
p.24 
14 The official histories were handled by several publishing houses, mainstream and academic.  
15 TNA CAB 103/83 pp. 4, 6.   
16 Lambert, A.D. ‘Sir Julian Corbett, naval history and the development of sea power theory’ in N.A.M. 
Rodger, J. Ross Dancy, Benjamin Darnell and Evan Wilson eds. Strategy and the Sea: Essays in Honour of 
John B. Hattendorf  Boydell and Brewer, Woodbridge 2016. pp.??? 
17 ‘Imperial Concentration 1914’ four lectures, dated War College, Greenwich, March 8-11 1920:  Corbett 
MS CBT23/3  
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paramount’.18 Placing the strategic narrative in the naval volumes would 
ensure the ‘continental’ impression created by the sheer scale of the military 
effort did not distort post-war strategy.19  
  Corbett’s war work began with creation of a running record, containing as 
much operational detail and strategic analysis as his inconsistent access to 
the higher direction of the war allowed. Used to the intellectual freedom of 
working on old wars, and the papers of long forgotten men, such restrictions 
were deeply frustrating.20 Despite the obstructionism of Admiralty Chief of 
Staff Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, Corbett was able to advance the analytical 
sections of the work, and ensure his staff collected and began to process the 
evidence that emerged, producing drafts for him to rework, revise and 
improve. The end of the war improved access to material and men, enabling 
him to impose a coherent strategic narrative on the operational account. 
Alongside official archives he exploited private papers, interviews, and the 
growing stream of publications, British, German, French and American.  
   His purpose remained constant, to carry forward pre-1914 strategic 
doctrine, suitably refined, reinforced, and above all free from the taint of 
Army ‘continentalism’. At the same time he had to address a new threat. The 
destruction of German naval power meant the greatest threat facing Britain 
was the United States, specifically the ‘Freedom of the Sea’ doctrines 
espoused by President Woodrow Wilson as the second of his Fourteen 
Points. For Corbett Wilson sought nothing less than the annihilation of 
seapower as strategy, and with that Britain’s: position in the world. Wilson 
arrived at the Paris Peace Conference, backed by a massive battlefleet 
building programme, determined to crush British ‘navalism’ as 
comprehensively as he had Prussian ‘militarism’, and European imperialism. 
His underlying agenda was simple: to render naval power ineffectual, 
removing Britain from her position as global hegemon, to open world 
markets to American capital. Although Wilson had been forced to back 
down at Paris, by British statesmen who based their arguments on powerful 
memoranda written by Corbett, both they and he recognised the threat would 
require a radical response. Had he lived these issues would have occupied 
much of his attention as he moved towards a conclusion, linking his wartime 
role combating German ‘navalism’ propaganda in the Untied States, with his 
thinking about more inclusive Empire/Commonwealth structures. He 
stressed the need to avoid the appearance of seeking or acquiring 
                                                 
18 Diary 16.3.1916: CBT 43/15. Schurman p. 165.  
19 Schurman p. 176 
20 Corbett to Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Bethell, commanding the Channel Fleet. The day after the 
Heligoland Bight action 1914: Bethell MS LHMAC 4-5.  
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overwhelming power at sea, which would only provoke others, and reducing 
the internal frictions of the imperial system, the better to secure the reality of 
power.21 He would have seen in the unwillingness of Congress to join 
Wilson’s ‘League of Nations’, or fund his coercive battlefleet, encouraging 
evidence that American hemispheric exceptionalism was far from dead. In 
January 1921 he compiled a paper on the strategic role of the Panama Canal 
in a war with the United States, and assisted Richmond address trade 
defence in such a conflict.22 These tasks shaped his thinking as he worked on 
Naval Operations. 
   Corbett began with a three stage concept, based on Churchill’s submission 
to the War Council of January 28th 1915, itself largely shaped by Lord 
Fisher’s views, as set out in a memorandum Corbett had written. The 
strategic pattern was simple. 
1st Phase: The clearing of the outer seas 
2nd Phase: The clearing of the North Sea. 
3rd Phase: The clearing of the Baltic.23 
  In Corbett’s elegantly written, easily understood exposition of the maritime 
core of British strategy the deft touches of an experienced analyst and master 
of literary composition illuminated every page. The first two volumes were 
largely complete by the summer of 1918, awaiting secret material relating to 
the Grand Fleet. The influence of the text was immediate. Jellicoe refused to 
set off on his Empire Mission to consider post war imperial naval policy 
before receiving an advance copy of volume I, because he ‘knew nothing 
that had occurred in the outer seas’ while Commanding the Grand Fleet. 
This was precisely the function Corbett had outlined in his December 1915 
Cabinet paper. Proof copies were supplied, ‘just in time’ for Jellicoe and 
chief of staff, Frederick Dreyer to sail on HMS New Zealand.24 Their impact 
can be read in Jellicoe’s report.  
   Corbett’s first two volumes traced the strategic direction of the war as 
Britain systematically cleared the outer seas of German ships and colonies, 
crushed the cruiser threat to ocean shipping, and then launched the great 
naval attack on the Dardanelles, followed by the amphibious strike at 
Gallipoli. His position on the Turkish adventure was clear: it had been the 
                                                 
21 Corbett to Sir George Aston 23.5.1918: Aston MS LHMAC. Aston was not convinced, he preferred 
absolute dominion.  
22 Diary 13.1.1921 – 19.1.1921: CBT 43/20 
23 Churchill statement to the War Council of 28.1.1915: Gilbert, M. Winston S. Churchill. Vol. III 
Companion Part I. London 1972  p.463 henceforth Companion.  
24 Jellicoe to Corbett 1.2.1919 & Corbett’s endorsement. CBT 7/15. Patterson, A T. ed. The Jellicoe Papers 
Vol. II. London Navy Records Society 1968 p.324. See also 283, 400-3, 412-19 for correspondence with 
Corbett.  
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only truly strategic combined operation of the war, and had to be studied in 
depth, but it had not been the best option.   
  Corbett always believed that the strategic concept he had outlined for 
Fisher in the famous ‘steady pressure’ paper was correct, and that Fisher’s 
plan to drive the Germans off the Belgian coast and back into the Heligoland 
Bight, before threatening to enter the Baltic was viable.25 Allowing Fisher to 
publish the paper in his Memoirs in 1919 ensured it had wide public 
circulation before Naval Operations appeared. By that time Corbett knew 
that he faced a major problem: something far more serious than Churchill’s 
foolish self-serving objections. He would have to explain the failure of 
British maritime strategy, and he would use the concept of ‘the deflection of 
strategy by politics, which had been a core argument of his 1911 doctrine 
primer, to do so.  
   Volume II ended with the dramatic departure of Fisher and Churchill, the 
Army locked into the Western Front and the Navy entangled in the Gallipoli 
debacle, the consequence of a series of strategic blunders that had wrecked 
the combined concept at the heart of Corbett’s concept of national strategy, 
while leeched vital specialist assets away from the primary maritime 
strategic targets, recovering the Flanders coast and taking control of the 
Baltic. He settled the treatment of Fisher’s resignation in discussions with 
George Lambert MP, one-time Admiralty Civil Lord and Fisher’s literary 
executor. Lambert invited him to write the official biography, a task he 
could not take up, and promised to assist him if Beatty contested his critical 
account of the Dogger Bank action.26  
   Corbett began writing Volume III after the war ended, and the Cabinet had 
come close to abandoning the whole project.27 He did so in the knowledge 
that the failure at Gallipoli and the apparently ‘indecisive’ outcome of 
Jutland posed critical challenges to his concept of British strategy, and the 
Royal Navy’s primacy in national defence. He began volume III on May 31st 
1920.28 Returning to work after major surgery Corbett outlined his approach 
to his old friend Henry Newbolt: ‘I mean it to be my book, not the 
Admiralty’s or anyone else’s. I find it fairly easy to employ my opinion in 
                                                 
25 Fisher Cabinet Memorandum 25.1.1915: Gilbert, M. Companion pp.263-4. Corbett Diary 25.1.1915: 
CBT43/14  
26. Corbett was the first choice to write Fisher’s authorised biography. Diary 29.12.1920; 16 & 24.2.1921; 
16.3.1921: CBT 43/19 & 20. Lambert spoke in the House on the subject. A biography of Fisher written by 
the man who best understood his strategic thinking, his focus on deterrence, and his wartime policy, might 
have transformed our understanding of the ‘Fisher Era’, shattering the reputations of weak-willed statesman 
and wooden headed general.  
27 Corbett’s Diary between January 1919 and April 1920 demonstrates that he was not working on Jutland, 
the second phase at Gallipoli, or anything else covered in Volume III.  
28 Diary 31.5.1920: CBT 43/19 
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telling the story without saying anything that is likely to cause obstruction.29 
That last claim may have been overly optimistic.  
   Corbett located the failure at Gallipoli in the politics of Grand Strategy, 
and the weakness of Russia, concluded that Britain had not employed the 
‘normal’ maritime strategy because it was tied to France and Russia, a 
sound, if slightly forced analysis reinforced by stressing the synergy between 
the ‘Western Front’ views of the French and the British General Staff. He 
implied that had Britain been acting under effective political direction, as it 
had in the Seven Year’s War, it would have employed a maritime/ 
expeditionary strategy, and upheld the national interest against the demands 
of temporary allies. Indeed, Corbett openly admired the ruthless way in 
which British statesmen of the eighteenth century had abandoned allies in 
1713 and 1762, to secure national objects.  
 Having rescued the strategic consequence of combined operations from the 
debacle at Gallipoli, Corbett moved on to explain Jutland, to ensure it was 
understood as a victory, one he could link to past precedent, and the final 
allied victory. While death denied him the opportunity to develop that theme 
in Naval Operations, he sketched the conclusion in a lecture on ‘Napoleon 
and the British Navy after Trafalgar’, delivered on October 11th 1921 to an 
audience that included the First Lord and members of the Naval Staff. 
  Corbett had been well aware of the contested nature of Jutland from the 
beginning. He discussed the battle with many officers, including Jellicoe, 
reading his Grand Fleet in February 1919, a text that influenced his own 
treatment.30 Jellicoe’s book, and the subsequent controversy, may have 
prompted First Sea Lord Sir Rosslyn Wemyss’ decision to commission a 
detailed narrative, without analysis, based on navigational records. Not only 
would such a text be immensely valuable to the official historian, but it 
might end the unseemly row brewing between the officers of the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet and the Grand Fleet. Captain John Harper completed his report 
just before Beatty replaced Wemyss at the Admiralty. Publication was 
delayed while Beatty, and the former Battle Cruiser Fleet officers who 
dominated his team, attempted to revise passages that showed them in a bad 
light, including the infamous 360 degree turn, poor gunnery and failure to 
report the enemy’s position. Harper requested a formal written order to make 
the revisions, which was never provided, while the furore obliged Jellicoe, 
who believed the report should be published without interference from 
himself or Beatty, to become involved.31 Aware that Beatty was attempting 
                                                 
29 Corbett to Newbolt 12.11.1920: CBT 3/7/92  
30 Corbett to Jellicoe 13.2.1919: Add. MS 49,037 f.128 
31 Jellicoe’s side of the story was published in 1968 in the Jellicoe Papers II  at pp.458-90. 
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to rewrite the battle Herbert Richmond observed: ‘A pity this as it will open 
the way to controversy afterwards‘.32 It is unlikely Corbett was unaware, but 
he had more pressing matters in hand at that time.  
  Corbett’s ‘battle’ of Jutland began on August 9th 1920. While on holiday 
with his family in North Wales he received a telegram from Beatty, 
requesting an urgent meeting. Returning to London he found a letter from 
Beatty, asking him to compile a forward to contextualize Harper’s Jutland 
Report, and claimed new evidence demonstrated ‘that the gunnery of the 
British Fleet was of a very high standard.’33 He confided to his diary: ‘they 
wanted me to write a foreword to Jutland report to explain how good our 
gunnery was & only failed thro’ bad shells against good armour - mean to 
get out of doing it if I can’. Without missing a beat Corbett reverted to the 
law, his original profession, telling Beatty that Longman’s contract gave 
them an exclusive right to publish an account based on official records. 
Admiralty Secretary Oswyn Murray, also the long-serving Treasurer of the 
Navy Records Society, ‘jumped at the idea that Longman’s position might 
provide an occasion for dropping the whole thing & handing it all over to 
me.’ Despite Corbett’s explanation of the legal position Beatty remained 
hopeful.34 In the end Beatty had to accept defeat, he could not publish 
Harper’s Report without a foreword to counter clear factual statement that 
highlighted his tactical failures, and poor gunnery resulted in defeat. A few 
days later Corbett learnt that Beatty’s approach followed Jellicoe’s rejection 
of a draft Admiralty forward, and proposed alterations to the text, which  
were ‘not justified by the records taken at the time, particularly the gunnery 
records and ranges.’ The foreword had been withdrawn, but battle raged 
over Beatty’s proposed textual changes, which Jellicoe insisted on 
approving. He was anxious to see Corbett’s account.35 A second meeting at 
the Admiralty revealed the Secretariat was anxious to suppress Beatty’s 
‘Admiralty’ forward, so Corbett called at Longman’s, and ‘redrafted’ the 
protest ‘in official style’.36 In June 1921 Corbett settled that Jutland would 
appear at the end of volume III, as yet unwritten, basing himself on Harper’s 
                                                 
32 Marder, A.J. Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond. Cape London 1952 
p.361. 
33 Beatty to Corbett 12.8.1920: Corbett Ms LHMAC 
34 Beatty to Corbett 17.8.1920: Corbett Ms LHMAC 
35 Diary 9-18.8.1920: CBT 43/19. Jellicoe to Corbett 16.8.1920: Corbett MS LHMAC 
36 Diary 3-4.9.1920 CBT 43/19 
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Report and charts. Jellicoe promised to help, an in return Corbett agreed to 
send any new material to the Admiral before publication.37 
   Defeated by Corbett’s skilful use of contract law, and frustrated by his 
inability to change the Harper Report Beatty commissioned another text.38 In 
November 1920 Captain Walter Ellerton, the Director of Training and Staff 
Duties, directed Captain Kenneth and Lieutenant Alfred Dewar to prepare a 
secret appreciation of the action, based on Admiralty Records, and the 
Harper Report, while based in his Department.  They were assisted by 
Lieutenant John Pollen, attached to Corbett’s section at the CID to work on 
the charts, Pollen had already assisted Harper. Dewar often worked at the 
CID, meeting Corbett on several occasions. 
  Dewar’s approach to Jutland was dominated a long-held conviction that the 
Navy needed a tactical system based on divisional principles, something he 
had discussed with Corbett in 1917. At that time he hoped that ‘if the history 
of this war is studied critically and fearlessly it will form the foundation 
stone of a new navy’, with a modern system of command.39 By September 
1921 Dewar’s draft was complete, but Captain Alfred Chatfield, as ACNS, 
demanded revisions to tone down the severe criticism of Jellicoe. One 
hundred copies of the final version were printed as Confidential Book 0938 
in late December. The date is important. Dewar opened his final paragraph 
with a direct rebuttal of the ‘decisive battle’ point Corbett made in his 
lecture ‘Napoleon and the British Navy after Trafalgar’ on October 10th 
1921. Dewar had discussed Jutland with Corbett four days before the lecture, 
and it seems that the last sentences of Corbett’s lecture ‘What material 
advantage did Trafalgar give that Jutland did not give? It is one that, in the 
present state of our knowledge, I will not venture to answer’40 were a 
critique of Dewar’s ideas.41 This was provocative, and Dewar’s riposte was 
even more explicit: his last paragraph read:  
It has been said that a great victory would have given us no more than 
we had. This is a lame commentary on the battle. It is not only a 
repudiation of the teachings of Nelson and Mahan, but it involves an 
entire misconception of the subsequent workings of the submarine 
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campaign, and reduces contemporary British strategy to the level of a 
farce. It is better to look facts in the face. The Battle of Jutland can only 
be regarded as the beginning of a great battle which was ever driven 
home. By studying its history we may redeem our shortcoming and 
discover another and sounder conception of tactics and command.42  
  The Admiralty Board intended to use Dewar’s text as the basis for an 
expurgated ‘Fleet edition’, for naval circulation, and after editing out any 
remaining criticism of Jellicoe, for public consumption. John Pollen was 
instructed to produce a version ‘free from criticism and comment’.43 When 
Pollen told Corbett about this Corbett repeated Longman’s argument.44 
Dewar visited Corbett at the CID in late December to inform him that he had 
finished his work, and would hand over all the evidence, along with the 
‘super secret appreciation unexpurgated.’45 Corbett received copy number 9 
of the ‘Staff Appreciation’ in early 1922, just as he began writing up Jutland. 
By the second week in February, while engaged on the ‘Run to the South’, 
he advised Captain Vernon S H Haggard, the new Director of Training and 
Staff Duties (DTSD), that Dewar’s version was divisive and misleading. A 
week later Haggard reported that Dewar’s volume would not be published, 
requesting Corbett return his copy.46 He resisted the request, advising 
Jellicoe that:  
The presentation of the facts seemed to me so faulty that I felt it my duty 
to intimate that my narrative would have to be entirely different. 
Whether similar opinions were expressed in other quarters I do not 
know. But in a few days I was informed that its issue was to be 
stopped.47 
Dewar lectured from the Staff Appreciation to the Naval Staff Course in 
1922, only to be derided by an audience that included John Harper and 
several veterans of the battle.48  
  While he disagreed with Dewar’s handling of the battle it is unlikely that 
Corbett objected to his introductory argument about the central role of the 
Baltic in British strategy. ’Germany’s practically undisputed control of the 
Baltic was a grave obstacle to the blockade, and acted as a powerful impetus 
to neutral trade. In addition to supplies from the West, it covered the 
                                                 
42 Schleihauf p.208. 
43 DTSD to Pollen 28.11.1921: BTY /9/5 
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important Swedish iron ore traffic, which, in the opinion of the French 
General Staff, was as vital to Germany as the supplies from the Lorraine and 
Luxembourg districts.’ If the High Seas Fleet ‘had been decisively defeated, 
a British squadron could have entered the Baltic…. Operating from Russian 
bases such a squadron would have tightened the commercial blockade, and 
opened the road or moral and material support to the Russian armies.’ Dewar 
also stressed how the High Seas Fleet had kept the Heligoland Bight open 
for the passage of submarines.49     
  Corbett’s account of the battle cruiser action, the ‘First Phase’ was ready to 
be typed up on February 16th. He discussed the next phase with Richmond 
two days later, enlightening him on ‘strategical aspects of the battle which 
he had never understood.’   By March 15th at the latest Corbett had accepted 
the need to cut Volume III in half, in order to include a full treatment of 
Jutland, advising Longman accordingly.50 In his last public speech he 
enlightened diners at the Naval Club with some reflections on his task, and 
his relationship with the Admiralty ‘which seemed to amuse them’.51 On the 
27th he was working on the ’Second Phase’, the Grand Fleet approach to 
battle. He spent the 31st at the Admiralty with Captain William ‘Bubbles’ 
James, Assistant DID ‘on various points on Jutland, especially on my 
differences with Dewar, whose facts were I fancied very loose.’52 The 
revised typescript of the Second Phase was discussed with Daniel and Bell 
on April 6th, and the ‘Third Phase’, the main fleet exchanges, on the 8th. That 
done Corbett sent the draft to Jellicoe, just before taking his customary 
Easter holiday.53   
  At this point Corbett broke of from Jutland to review the chapters dealing 
with the Gallipoli evacuations, completed in late 1921, before it was typeset. 
Once settled at Stopham he began the night actions of the ‘Fourth Phase’, 
which were finished by early May, and then launched straight into the ‘Last 
Phase’, the morning after.54 Much of May was spent correcting Jutland and 
the Gallipoli evacuation, and then clearing contentious passages with the 
Naval Staff. 
  In the middle of this hectic schedule Corbett discussed whether to accept a 
quarter of a million pounds for one of the London streets in the family 
portfolio. He and his brother Charlie decided against.55 Corbett’s financial 
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position was such that he did not need to work, let alone to carry on the 
punishing schedule indicated by his diaries. Determined to complete the task 
he ignored obvious signs of failing health, major surgery for bladder stones, 
high blood pressure, pulmonary problems and bad teeth, working six or 
seven days a week, often long into the evening.  
  The last section of Jutland was sent to be typed in mid June. At the end of 
the month further corrections from John Pollen were worked in, and shared 
with Jellicoe.56 While Jutland was being revised Corbett began the ‘Home 
Waters’ chapters, XIII and XIV, which linked the Gallipoli evacuations to 
Jutland. Jellicoe read his account of Jutland, ‘highly approving of what I had 
done & inclosed the mods prepared for a new edition of his Grand Fleet – 
containing many additions for further information & answers to current 
criticism.’ Corbett responded:  
 My general impression on the whole affair now is that nothing you 
could have done could have forced Scheer to decisive action except 
meeting him in the morning between him and his base and this he 
prevented simply because the necessary information which the 
Admiralty had intercepted was not passed on to you. 
At the same time he pressed Jellicoe for more details of the routes he had 
believed open to Scheer, perhaps the most acute question that anyone asked 
him.57 Having worked through the evidence, and formed his own 
conclusions, Corbett the first half of the book to the Admiralty, Foreign 
Office and War Office on the same day, leaving himself more time to work 
on the controversial sections. On July 18th he learnt that Dewar’s account 
would not be published, and claimed full credit for that decision.58 Haggard’s 
report on Dewar’s ‘Staff Appreciation’ adopted Corbett’s argument and, 
from the decidedly legal terms in which he expressed himself, a good deal of 
his language as well.  
The mental attitude of the writer was rather that of a counsel for the 
prosecution than of an impartial appraiser of facts, and an obvious bias 
animates his statements throughout the book, leading to satirical 
observations and certain amount of misrepresentation. 
Chatfield and Keyes recommended the book be suppressed, and destroyed 
almost all the copies, not only was it full of ‘satirical observations’, ‘bias’ 
and ‘misrepresentation’, it also deprecated the line of battle, and could hardly 
be sent out while this tactic remained central to naval doctrine, and above all 
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because publication would ‘rend the Service to its foundation’.59 They turned 
to Pollen’s expurgated edition, which deleted three chapters, and all 
reference to Room 40. Pollen was chosen as a chart expert without literary 
skill or imagination to alter the underlying message. The deleted chapters, I, 
II  and VIII set out Dewar’s argument that a ‘decisive victory’ would have 
prevented the submarine campaign, and opened the Baltic, his critique of 
Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet Battle Orders, and the indictment of his deployment of 
the fleet at 6.15 pm. Haggard and Pollen settled the abridged edition.60 While 
Keyes agreed to publish the work would not appear before Naval Operations, 
because Longmans, assisted by Corbett, insisted on their contractual rights.61 
Pollen’s Admiralty Narrative finally appeared in 1924.62    
  Meeting Hankey on June 27th Corbett told him that his account ‘would 
show how Beatty spoiled the battle. If he objected I could not alter. Hankey 
said then it would have to go to Cabinet.’63 Satisfied that he was right Corbett 
would not back down to a mere First Sea Lord. On August 1st Corbett and his 
family went to Stopham for the summer, where he worked hard reviewing 
the Jutland drafts, a task that occupied the entire month.  There were some 
major issues to address, as he told Jellicoe:  
  Since writing the battle-cruiser action I have seen the secret report and 
am altering or rather reinforcing their gunnery failure as contrasted with 
that of 5th BS. 
  The way the Operations Division dealt with the intercepts seems to 
have left much to be desired and I have already noted specially the 
omission to send you the one about the air reconnaissance off Horns 
Reef. From the nature of the case I cannot say as much as I would like 
on this point. The summaries that were sent you were obviously 
misleading. I have all the intercepts now... 
This letter disposes of the claim that Jellicoe had been unaware of the signals 
intelligence failure, and emphasizes how Corbett’s final version evolved 
through constant interaction with evidence and actors, even as the final draft 
was being compiled. He valued Jellicoe’s input: ‘your notes will enable me 
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to improve and strengthen the narrative in many places. But it is a great 
satisfaction to me to have your approval of it as a whole.64  
  The first two chapters were sent back to London in early September, 
followed by the preliminary Chapters XIII, XIV and XV, Corbett received 
the remaining three Jutland chapters on September 9th. Four days later the 
first page proofs of the volume reached him, Bell came down on the 19th 
with charts and papers for a day’s work. In a characteristic comment Corbett 
that the 20th was ‘A Lovely Day’ … He died on the 22nd, without writing 
another word in his diary. Colonel Edmond Daniel RM, a friend and 
colleague for twenty years, undertook to ensure his text was not ‘interfered 
with in any way after it has left this office. But I anticipate considerable 
trouble with the present Board of Admiralty over certain passages.’65 Daniel 
was well aware what those troubles would be.  
  To ensure his readers recognised the linkage between the failure to put 
pressure on the enemy outside the North Sea and the limited success of naval 
action within it Corbett produced a strategic overview of the campaign in 
Home Waters between the evacuation of the Gallipoli beachheads and 
Jutland. Gallipoli had crippled the development of maritime strategy, as 
Fisher had feared, putting ‘it out of the power of the fleet to influence the 
general course of the war by high offensive action in Home waters.’ While 
avoiding explicit judgement on the relative strategic merits of Gallipoli and 
the Baltic, he observed that the Dardanelles had dragged critical human 
resources to the Mediterranean, weakening the combat power of the Grand 
Fleet.66 He noted Jellicoe’s protests against the constant drain on skilled 
manpower from shipyards as well as the fleet, which delayed the completion 
of new ships, and exacerbated the difficulty of fitting them out. These, he 
inferred, were faulty dispositions of resources.  
  Corbett set up Jutland by demonstrating how the Royal Navy had crushed 
Germany’s ability to use the North Sea for trade and fishing, and reduced the 
naval threat posed by surface mine-laying through active patrolling into the 
Skagerrack. More ambitious operations, on the German Coast, or into the 
Baltic, remained impossible without deployable troops, and while so many 
heavy ships, flotillas, and most of Fisher’s ‘Siege Fleet’ were committed to 
Gallipoli.67 Ever on the look out for corroborating evidence Corbett inserted 
Reinhard Scheer’s judgement that the British understood the wisdom of 
holding ‘immovably on the ocean communications’ too well ’ever to throw 
                                                 
64 Corbett to Jellicoe 3.8.1922: Add. Ms 49,037 f.183. 
65 Diary August-September 1922: CBT 43/21. Daniel to Jellicoe 2.10.1922: Add. Ms 49,037 ff.189-90 
66 NO III p.259 
67 NO III p.273 
 17 
it way by clamouring for a hazardous advance into German waters’.68 
Recognising the Corbettian nature of British strategy, and the crushing 
impact of the blockade on Germany’s war effort, Scheer had no option but to 
challenge the Grand Fleet’s grip. This subtle message, carefully spun out of 
British policy and German reactions, undermined the ‘decisive battle’ 
school, and prompted Beatty’s spiteful rejoinder. 
  The strategic emphasis stretched beyond British decision-making: ‘The 
sanguine illusions with which the Great General Staff has plunged into the 
war had faded away. Their cherished doctrine was failing them. The cardinal 
article of their creed was to crush the armed forces of the enemy by a swift 
and unrelenting offensive.’69 While the text pointed to the failure of German 
thinking the real target was closer to home, leaving out the signifier that the 
Staff in question was German Corbett encouraged readers to understand the 
passage as a criticism of British continentalism, a point emphasised by the 
subsequent section, which stressed the strategic impact of British and allied 
operations outside Europe. Here he exploited the memoirs of General von 
Falkenhayen, Chief of the German General Staff, and Kurt Hellfrich, the 
Secretary of State, which recorded the change in German strategy and the 
shift towards unrestricted U-boat warfare.70 Corbett obtained Tirpitz’s 
Memoirs in December 1919, working into volumes I & II retrospectively, 
those of Reinhard Scheer appeared four months later.71 
  Corbett began the build up to Jutland with the dawning realisation in 
Britain that the failure at Gallipoli meant something had to be done to force 
the Germans to shift their focus to the North, and this meant ‘reviving 
Fisher’s ‘still-born plan’, and seizing any opportunity ‘to upset the German 
war plans by forcing them to dissipate forces for the defence of their 
northern front’, ideally by landing in Denmark, if ‘the neutrality of 
Denmark, like that of Belgium, should be violated by the enemy.’72 Fisher’s 
Baltic plan remained the capstone of British strategy, using 
maritime/economic power to defeat larger, more populous continental states. 
He condemned the misuse of Fisher’s ‘special fleet’, eaten away by the 
Dardanelles, and sending the troops evacuated from Gallipoli to moulder at 
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Salonica, which meant there were no troops at hand to support operations in 
the North Sea area, not even to hold Zealand.  
  In the summer of 1916 the absence of deployable armies in the Northern 
theatre condemned both sides to naval or, in Corbett’s terms minor, 
strategies, any prospect of a major offensive further constrained by the 
critical defensive roles that both fleet occupied in increasingly continental 
strategies. Despite this the movements that culminated at Jutland were the 
most ambitious yet undertaken by either Fleet. After a succession of sorties 
which tried to bring on a major battle by staging pin-prick air raids and mine 
laying in the North Sea Jellicoe finally accepted the compelling strategic 
logic of the war. Only by threatening Germany’s grip on the Baltic could he 
influence German strategy. Consequently he:     
prepared a plan that went beyond anything he had yet hazarded. Two 
squadrons of light cruisers were to proceed to the Skaw, which they 
were to reach by dawn on June 2. Thence they would sweep right down 
the Kattegat as far as the Great Belt and the Sound, while a battle 
squadron would push into the Skagerrak in support. Such a bait, it was 
hoped, could scarcely fail to draw a strong enemy force from the Bight. 
Possibly, as had happened before, they would not come far enough 
north to ensure an action, but at least they might be lured into a trap.73  
The trap consisted of a new minefield and submarines at the Horn’s Reef, 
the northernmost exit from the German minefields.  
   In the event the Germans sortied before Jellicoe’s plans could be put into 
effect, seeking to draw Jellicoe over a submarine ambush, and then destroy a 
portion of his fleet. While we can only speculate on the effect Jellicoe’s 
operation might have produced the overriding importance of the Baltic in 
British war planning explained why Jellicoe was in the Skagerrak on 31 
May, while the date was determined by political pressure. David French 
stressed: ‘the 1916 campaign was conducted by a government which badly 
needed some spectacular victories to increase its waning authority’.74 Little 
wonder there was widespread disappointment that the naval battle that 
finally occurred was not a new Trafalgar.  
  Corbett stressed that Jellicoe’s primarily defensive mission, covering the 
British coast and the 10th Cruiser Squadron, meant his base was too far 
north, leaving little time to locate and defeat an enemy fleet in the German 
Bight. Yet he was satisfied that the chances of battle were high when the 
Clausewitzian friction of war intervened, drawing a pointed analogy 
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between Jellicoe’s position and that of Nelson in March 1805, when 
Villeneuve evaded a brilliant ambush by pure luck. The deliberate reference 
to The Campaign of Trafalgar stressed his contention that Jutland and 
Trafalgar had secured the same result.75 Finally there was the all-important 
issue of friction. The chance sighting of a Danish steamer brought the Battle 
cruisers into contact before Scheer had come far enough north to suit 
Jellicoe. Scheer had recognised his good fortune.76  
  To get his book past an Admiralty Board packed with Battle Cruiser 
officers Corbett found excuses for the strikingly poor gunnery of Beatty’s 
ships in the ‘Run to the South, including destroyers steaming past on the 
engaged side that spoiled the range, and Jellicoe’s contention that poor 
quality shells had saved the Germans.77 Instead he described the shooting of 
the 5ht Battle Squadron as ‘magnificent’, leaving readers to contrast it with 
the lamentable efforts of the battle cruisers. Relying on ‘irrefutable’ facts 
Corbett was highly critical of Beatty’s turn to the East, his failure to 
maintain contact with the enemy and his own light cruisers, during the Run 
to the North, and his failure to provide Jellicoe with accurate information 
about enemy course and speed. He was also criticised for passing across the 
front of the Grand Fleet, obscuring Jellicoe’s range at a critical moment. The 
infamous 360 degree turn by HMS Lion was mentioned, as a ‘complete 
circle’, along with the seven minutes that it took to complete.78 Recognising 
the limits of his position, disbarred from ‘judgement’ Corbett selected his 
facts with care, leaving his readers to grasp the deeper import of his words 
by ‘reading between the lines.’ This was not unreasonable: his target 
audience were mid to senior ranking naval officers, men who did not need 
his help to grasp the meaning of the evidence.  
  Jellicoe emerged as a paragon of command. Corbett began by setting out 
Jellicoe’s doctrine of fighting a main fleet battle at 15,000 yards to avoid the 
torpedo threat.79 He also drew attention to Jellicoe’s deployment into line as 
the ‘supreme moment of the naval war’, a tactical move that placed him in 
the pantheon of modern fleet tacticians. The argument was reinforced by 
linking him with the great pre-war Admirals, Wilson, Bridgeman, May and 
Callaghan. He explained Jellicoe’s decision to avoid night action through an 
analogy with ‘The Glorious 1st of June’, assuming his readers did not need to 
be reminded of details of the older battle. Lord Howe’s decision to wait for 
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another day to ensure he had enough time to complete his battle was a 
powerful precedent – not least because the dates so nearly matched. Both 
Jellicoe and Howe had outmanoeuvred the enemy, taking station between 
them and their base, forcing them to give battle.80  
  To explain how the enemy had escaped, despite Jellicoe’s strategic success, 
Corbett emphasised the role of contingency, ’the good fortune which the 
Germans had earned by their bold movement stood by them’ in the night 
action. Furthermore there had been serious failures by British divisional 
commanders. The most glaring was that of Commodore Farie, leading the 
13th Destroyer Flotilla, who effectively opened a path for Scheer through the 
British destroyers. As a result ‘the impossible had happened. In spite of the 
massed flotilla rear guard Admiral Scheer had succeeded in passing across 
his adversary’s wake during the hours of darkness, and without injury to a 
single capital ship.’ Not only was Jellicoe excused, but post-war Naval War 
Course students should understand that destroyer flotillas could not be relied 
on to stop battle fleets at night.81  
  Finally Corbett gave the Germans agency. Unlike the brave amateurs 
Nelson had annihilated at Trafalgar they were the equal of the British unit 
for unit, and Jellicoe had been wise to treat them as such. Corbett 
emphasised Scheer’s ‘bold and skilful’ performance, developing a point he 
had established earlier in the book, where he credited the ‘skill and boldness’ 
of Lt Cmdr Hersing of U21 in his ‘brilliant’ attack on HMS Majestic at 
Gallipoli. Retreating in the face of ‘a greatly superior force’ because he 
could not risk a fleet action, Scheer had done ‘enough for honour’. Evading 
the trap which Jellicoe had set for him was ‘enough to enrol his name high 
upon the list of fleet leaders.’ Just how high became clear in a long footnote, 
stressing the connection between Scheer’s battle plan and Nelson’s Trafalgar 
Memorandum. Scheer had a final stroke of luck: he avoided the submarine 
ambush Jellicoe had positioned at the Horn’s Reef, because the boats had 
been directed to expect the enemy on June 2nd.82 By emphasising the skill 
and determination of the enemy, making Scheer and his fleet worthy 
opponents, Corbett distanced Jutland from Trafalgar, reinforcing his stress 
on the contingent nature of battle, where chance, friction and the unforeseen 
compromised every plan. Raising Scheer to the pantheon of great Admirals, 
in line with the Admiral’s own estimation, and stressing the quality of the 
High Seas Fleet reduced the disappointment of an incomplete victory. 
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‘Decisive’ victory had not been a necessary, or perhaps wise, object for 
Jellicoe.  
   Volume III ended without a conclusion on Jutland, whether he elected not 
to essay one in what was already a profoundly controversial volume, or 
thought it better to link his analysis to the shift of strategic focus that would 
follow in volume IV is unknown. We can be certain that it was not because 
he had simply run out of space. Corbett followed the same model used in 
The Seven Year’s War and Trafalgar, with a detailed build up to emphasise 
that ‘decisive’ battles had to be worked for, using large scale combined 
operations against strategically critical enemy targets,  followed by a 
relatively short battle narrative. Naval Operations should be read as an 
extended analysis of how British strategy was intended to work, and why it 
had failed on this occasion. The argument was carefully constructed to 
explain the failure without challenging the underlying pattern. Gallipoli 
should have been a new Quebec, a successful combined operation that 
obliged the enemy to risk his fleet in offensive operations, leading to its’ 
destruction at a new Quiberon. The causes of failure were primarily the 
disarticulation of combined strategy, which saw a British Expeditionary 
Force, designed to support maritime strategy, committed to open-ended 
continental operations. This led to a purely naval attack on the Dardanelles, 
followed by a belated, under-resourced amphibious effort. Fisher’s Baltic 
vision had the power to unsettle the Germans, the evidence suggests that a 
British fleet entering, or even threatening to enter, the Baltic would have 
prompted a German invasion of Denmark.83 Corbett never lost sight of 
Fisher’s vision, or the resources he created to conduct it. The opportunity to 
test the thesis, which Jellicoe planned for early June 1916, had been lost 
when Scheer launched his own operation.  
   For Corbett the critical point in 1916 was the absence of a modern version 
of General Craig’s Expeditionary Force, whose dispatch to Sicily prompted 
Napoleon to order Villeneuve to sea in October 1805, just as the loss of 
Canada had dragged France into an invasion plan in 1759. That the 
destination of Craig’s troops had been a strategically vital island which, like 
Zealand, commanded key maritime arteries was not accidental. Corbett had 
recognised the contemporary resonance of the analogy back in 1910 – when 
he had stressed ‘the old law which gives to such expeditions as Craig’s a 
disturbing power out of all proportion to their intrinsic force, was beginning 
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to work’.84 The strategic significance of Jellicoe’s projected advance into the 
Kattegatt had been fatally weakened by the lack of military manpower. Had 
Jellicoe advanced with an uncommitted army loitering offshore in transports 
the High Seas Fleet would have been forced to fight to the finish for the 
Baltic narrows. Ultimately Corbett’s treatment of the contested issues of 
1915 and 1916 massaged the events of the day, and indeed the rest of the 
war, to ensure the book worked effectively as doctrine primer, something he 
had done in all his works since 1907. His management of the evidence, 
clarity of argument and considerable literary power ensured this was 
precisely the book his well-defined target audience required. Furthermore 
the experience of the First World War had changed his assessment of the 
Napoleonic conflict, leading him to argue that the true significance of 
Trafalgar had been obscured behind wave of unthinking patriotism.  
  Corbett’s text ended with the Grand Fleet returning to base on June 1st 
1916. It did not include his after action assessment, or, more significantly, 
any analysis of strategic consequences. Fortunately we know what he 
thought. Not only had be discussed the subject in his ‘Napoleon’ lecture but 
when 1928 Henry Newbolt finally published volume IV in 1928, after 
Beatty had left the Admiralty, he reflected on the ‘irreparable’ loss the 
project had suffered, and the ‘coincidence’ that ‘the first stage of the war had 
been brought to a definite conclusion’ at Jutland. ‘The period of great naval 
operations in the old sense was over: the remaining volumes… were to deal 
with a new kind of war, a naval war on a vast scale, but conducted mainly by 
blockade and counter-blockade, both unexampled in kind: and with a moral 
struggle in which the vital conflict at sea was inseparably interwoven with a 
conflict of imponderable forces.’85 There was something strikingly 
Mahanian about this, echoing the division of The Influence of Sea Power 
upon the French Revolution and Empire, where Trafalgar ended the fleet 
battle phase of the war, and the ‘Continental System’ began the next. This 
may have been Corbett’s scheme, and it may have been discussed with 
Daniel. The appearance of a favourite Corbett word ‘strategical’, on the first 
page of Newbolt’s book seems to reflect that legacy. Newbolt’s judgement 
on Jutland stressed that command of the North Sea had not been challenged, 
that the blockade remained unbroken, and the superiority of the Grand Fleet 
had been enhanced.    
    Despite Beatty’s anxiety to prevent the appearance of an ‘Official’ 
account of the battle that endorsed Jellicoe, he was powerless. He took a 
                                                 
84 Corbett 1907  II pp. 1-4.Corbett 1910 p.274 . In both cases the purpose of the discussion was current 
doctrine, not historical reflection.  
85 Newbolt IV 1929 p.v. 
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coward’s revenge, back-stabbing a dead man, burdening he the book with an 
Admiralty disclaimer:  
Their Lordships find that some of the principles advocated in this book, 
especially the tendency to minimize the importance of seeking battle 
and of forcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with their 
views.86  
The minute had been written by Keyes, Churchill helped with phrasing.87 
Anxious to avoid anything that might harm sales Corbett’s long serving 
publishers neatly hid it behind a diagram of Jellicoe’s deployment on the 
port column – an image that emphasised the scale and power of the Grand 
Fleet, and Jellicoe’s victory. By publicly disassociating the Service from a 
book consciously crafted to enhance public appreciation of the Navy’s role 
in the war the Admiralty shot themselves in the collective foot. In his 
defence Beatty, as a First Sea Lord waging war with the Treasury over the 
budget, could not allow his reputation to be publicly lowered. The aura of 
glory was vital to his political position. Set against the medium term future 
of the Navy factual truth was not so great a prize as historians might 
imagine.88 Jellicoe had the last word: ‘I find it difficult to express my 
admiration for the style of the narrative, the language in which it is 
expressed, and its accuracy.’89  
  Naval Operations was written to support post-war naval education and 
doctrine development, connect the World War with past practice, and above 
all to rescue national strategy from the lazy assumption that the only way to 
defeat Germany had been to copy the German approach to war – mass 
armies and ‘decisive battle’. The next time Britain went to war it ended up 
waging Corbettian war for eighteen months against a major European 
coalition, because it had no other choice. This was not dissimilar to the 
position it occupied between 1807 and 1812, and in both cases the enemy 
overreached themselves, providing Britain with allies who took up the 
burden of mass warfare on land. Corbett’s text laid out the underlying 
strategic concepts with compelling clarity, along with his judgement that 
Fisher, and Fisher alone, had the vision and ability to create a coherent grand 
strategy, consistent with British experience, and exploit the emerging 
strategic opportunities. He used Jutland to demonstrate that the effective 
development of British strategy depended on the combined action of navy 
and army, that ‘decisive’ naval battles were set up by the effective use of 
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military force, and that unless an enemy was compelled to fight to the finish 
in defence of higher, strategic interests, it was unlikely any naval combat 
would have significant strategic impact. Furthermore victory in naval battle 
was remarkably unimportant, as long as Britain retained sea control. On 
those grounds he publicly declared Jutland had served the Britain as well as 
Trafalgar. While he did not live to complete the ‘official’ version of that 
argument, or bring his deep engagement with the decisive quality of 
commanding the Baltic to a resolution, Naval Operations signposted his 
conclusions and, supplemented by his other publications, his correspondence 
and records provides ample evidence of that higher strategic purpose. 
